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On the afternoon of May 8 a powerful bomb placed in the men's bathroom by unidentified
assailants, ripped through the second floor dining room of a MacDonald's restaurant in downtown
Guatemala City. The explosion tore a hole through the restaurant's roof, shattered windows and
left several people injured. The bombing is part of a growing wave of terror in the Guatemalan
capital. In the past few weeks, at least six bombs have exploded in government office buildings,
shopping centers and restaurants, and around 500 bomb threats have been reported. Government
officials say they are considering declaring a state of siege, as rumors abound of a possible coup
d'etat, social strife spirals and guerrilla activity spreads throughout the country. Some speak of the
"Peruvianization" of Guatemala. LADB conducted an extensive phone interview on the Guatemalan
situation with a well-informed Western source in Guatemala City. The long-time Guatemala
observer who was by coincidence in the McDonald's restaurant when the bombing occurred
requested anonymity for personal security reasons. Excerpts from the interview follow. LADB:
To what do you attribute the recent spate of bombings, threats and violence? The government
has stated that there are three different factors involved: guerrilla terrorism, narco- terrorism,
and in the words of President Jorge Serrano "disaffected groups" trying to take advantage of the
atmosphere of chaos to destabilize the government, damage Guatemala's international image, and
even to foment conditions for a coup plot. It is very difficult to say concretely who is responsible
for the bombings and bomb threats. As for the rebels, they were probably involved in some cases,
based on the type of explosive artifacts used, as well as the selected targets. For instance, a few
days ago a bomb was discovered and deactivated in front of the Army Officer Fraternity Club,
which is located near the National Palace. This is a target the guerrillas would choose. The URNG
[Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, rebel umbrella organization] has denied involvement
in recent bombings against civilian targets. There is also an element of truth in blaming drug
traffickers. For example, a few days before the McDonald's bombing, another explosive device
was deactivated after authorities received a phone call from someone who said he represented the
"Zacapa cartel." (Ed. note: A local drug trade cartel based in Zacapa, Guatemala, is believed to be
a junior partner of Colombian cartels now using Guatemala as a transshipment point.) The bomb
threat was interpreted as a warning to authorities to drop proceedings to extradite former Zacapa
mayor Arnoldo Vargas to the US. However, most observers attribute the current wave of violence
to a campaign by extreme rightist groups aimed at destabilizing the government. This is the most
plausible explanation. These groups are not necessarily outside the government. As is often the case
in Guatemala, they could well be rightwing factions within the military and the government itself.
The rightist extremists have two possible objectives. One is to force Serrano to declare a state of
siege, which would weaken the government politically, make it more susceptible to manipulation,
and justify a crackdown against popular sectors. It is important to note that the current campaign of
terror coincides with the upsurge of spontaneous popular protests, and to what people are referring
to as an imminent "social explosion" in the country. A state of siege would justify a crackdown, as
well as suspending talks between the URNG and the government. If this is indeed the explanation
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for the bombings, then the intense propaganda campaign launched by the army to blame the
guerrillas for the wave of bombings and bomb threats certainly makes sense. The second, and less
probable possibility, is that the extreme right groups are trying to foment the conditions for a coup
d'etat. There have been persistent rumors in this regard, and it should not be ruled out. However,
both national and international conditions for a coup are extremely unfavorable. Guatemala is
very distinct from Venezuela and Peru. The attempted coup in Venezuela and the de facto coup
in Peru enjoyed widespread social support. In Guatemala, there is no support whatsoever for an
extreme right putsch. And if you look at the international reaction to Peru, it has been timid, at best.
The international backlash to a Guatemalan coup would be harsh. There would be no sympathy
internationally for such an action. LADB: How secure is the Serrano administration? How successful
might such pressures be? If the bomb scares fizzle out soon, then they will probably not create the
type of anarchy and chaos that would force the government to declare a state of siege. However, if
these terrorist campaigns continue beyond a few weeks, in the medium to long term, then Serrano
will be very vulnerable to destabilization. Last week, President Serrano said he has been considering
a state of siege, although he indicated that conditions do not yet warrant it. However, since then,
the terror has not only continued, but escalated. In addition to McDonald's, bombs have exploded
in shopping centers, and bomb threats continue unabated. They are creating a near panic at this
point in the capital. Social conflict is escalating, and at the same time the guerrillas are stepping up
their activities. For example, on May 8 the same day as the explosion at McDonald's rebels downed
two major electricity towers in El Quiche causing blackouts throughout the department. If this
situation continues at this pace for several more weeks, then it could have the effect of forcing the
government to declare a state of siege. A crisis situation is clearly developing. But it is too early
to predict where all this will end up. LADB: What is the climate in the capital? Is there a sense
of panic? There is a constant feeling of tension in the air. Wherever you go, people are talking
about it and are getting more concerned because the terror has not abated. People are taking more
precautions. We have to realize how easy it is to create panic. This is a brilliant scheme, not only
because it produces the effects that the perpetrators are after, but also because it is impossible to
stop. It could be that only five people are responsible for the entire campaign. All they have to do
is place a single bomb in one place, and at the same time make 50 calls to 50 different offices. All
50 offices are evacuated causing havoc and panic, the police and fire departments rush their forces
out. So it has the desired effect, and it is going on day after day. LADB: To what do you attribute
the upsurge of popular protests across the country? In 1988-89 there was a tremendous growth in
the popular movement, culminating in a general public sector strike and mass protests. But intense
repression set in from 1989 to 1991 which quieted things down. It appears now that the popular
movement is in the preliminary stages of a mass resurgence. Peasant and labor organizations, and
especially human rights groups, are becoming active again, even though they are not yet mobilizing
in a coordinated way. For example, beginning late last year spontaneous riots broke out in one
municipality after another all over the country. Townspeople and villagers have attacked local
mayors and administrators for inadequate public services or corruption in the use of public funds.
These uprisings forced municipal administrations to resign en masse. These are local "coup d'etats"
at the municipal level around the country, and they are uncontrollable. In addition, since March
there has been an upsurge of land invasions. These are not just invasions of farmland by peasants,
but invasions of urban lots by homeless families and slumdwellers here in the capital and in other
cities. These invasions involve up to 10,000 people. In each of several dozen such mass actions since
March, the government has reacted by sending in the army and security forces. There is also a
revitalization of the CUC (Coordinadora de Unidad Campesina). The CUC has been organizing
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farmworkers and landless peasants on the Pacific coastal plantations, and for the first time in over
a decade, led a mass march of 10,000 peasants from the western highlands to the capital in April.
Then we have student riots breaking out in the capital over abominable educational conditions.
The students had been protesting for months, but in April they brought it to a new level by rioting,
burning buses, smashing windows in the streets. All of this is taking place simultaneously, but
somewhat anarchically and spontaneously. The moment protests break out in one place, they
usually generate protests and militant actions elsewhere, a type of chain reaction. We are currently
seeing the generation of a new chain reaction. Perpetrators of the violence in the capital fear that
this movement will snowball beyond control. In addition, they fear that socioeconomic conditions
have deteriorated to the point where there is fertile ground for a "social explosion." LADB: It sounds
like the government is facing a situation of ungovernability. You have to understand Guatemala.
The situation I have described is not yet abnormal for this country, although it is fast becoming so. I
use the analogy of volcanic lava to describe Guatemala: there is always molten lava flowing through
the country, with explosions and fires here and there, and constant minor eruptions. But now we
are seeing the volcano build up, which could very well end up in a major eruption. And there could
well be infiltration by the left the guerrillas to try and bring about such an eruption. You can't
discard that. LADB: So what is your prediction? If a state of siege is declared, or even if there is not a
formal state of siege, what kind of a scenario are we talking about? Will we see a wave of repression
comparable to the early 1980s? Are we talking about a Guatemalan-style "auto-golpe?" It is difficult
to say with any certainty. I do not believe that the perpetrators of the bomb scares are after a military
coup. A coup would probably not get enough support within the armed forces to succeed, although
perhaps I am wrong. The more likely scenario, in my perspective, is that if the current pressures
continue, the government will cave in and crack down hard on the popular movement. A more
realistic scenario, therefore, is a steady increase in repression which has always been cyclical and
business as usual in Guatemala combined with a suspension of the peace talks and a new, massive
counterinsurgency drive. Even if the government does not decree a formal state of siege, steppedup repression would constitute capitulation to the campaign of terror. There was some speculation
several months ago that Serrano was about to do exactly what President Alberto Fujimori ended
up doing in Peru. This speculation was warranted because Serrano and other officials made
explicit statements regarding the ineffectiveness of formal government institutions and procedures
in addressing the nation's problems. It is also worth pointing out that the government has not
condemned the Fujimori coup in Peru, has not broken off diplomatic relations, and maintains the
official position that Fujimori is the democratically-elected president of Peru. This shows that, at
the executive level, there is admiration here for Peru, and that if they could do it here, they would.
However, the conditions are just not appropriate in Guatemala for that type of action. LADB: Can
you speak about the upsurge in guerrilla activity? How strong is the insurgency? And also on the
prospects regarding the government-rebel talks? The army perceives the guerrilla movement as a
"nuisance" rather than as a major military-political adversary which actually threatens the security
of the state. The guerrillas are limited at this time to a war of attrition in the countryside, based on
hit-and-run actions. Rather than a quantitative increase in guerrilla forces, we have seen a change
in the guerrillas' tactics and strategy aimed at increasing visibility. This change started about three
years ago, and we are now seeing its cumulative effects. In 1989, the URNG decided to move from
remote locations to suburban areas in the capital and other cities, and to open up new fronts in the
heartland of the country, including the Pacific coast plantations. Second, the guerrillas commenced
economic sabotage or targeting infrastructure components, and not just military units. All of the
above has the effect of creating the perception of war on the outskirts of the capital. However, in
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reality, and in military terms alone, it has very little significance. The significance in more political
than military. The other factor is the signing of the peace treaty in El Salvador. Guatemala's extreme
right sectors saw what was happening in El Salvador and said, in effect, "It is not going to happen
here." Guatemala's internal situation is very different from El Salvador. The URNG does not have
the military prowess to force the government into a dialogue. The guerrillas' only real playing card
is political insisting on negotiations with the backing of international pressure. However, there has
been a decline in international pressures on Guatemala to push negotiations forward, combined
with a basic change in the Mexican government's policy. Mexico has decided to come out in support
of the Serrano government and to pressure the rebels to disarm. Several factors combined explain
the hardening of the government's position in February when officials rejected discussion of any
and all concessions. Even though the peace talks continue in principle, the talks are stalemated.
If the current situation continues, the government will probably suspend the talks altogether,
perhaps with the argument that the guerrillas are responsible for the wave of bombings. LADB: To
what do you attribute the decline in international pressures on Guatemala for the peace process to
continue? First, those countries that were very active in El Salvador are not interested in becoming
involved in Guatemala, particularly the "Support Group" (Spain, Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico).
Mexico was the only one of these countries which demonstrated an active interest in Guatemala.
Mexico played a particularly important role in El Salvador, pressuring both the government and the
guerrillas into negotiations because the rebels given their military and political prowess merited
the role of a contender for power. Mexican officials have made it clear that the URNG cannot count
on Mexico City to apply the same pressure as in the Salvadoran case. In December, President
Carlos Salinas de Gortari met with URNG leaders, explaining that they should not expect strong
backing for negotiations because the URNG is not comparable to the Salvadoran insurgency. At
the same time, the Mexican government is very anxious to see political stability and an end to
the guerrilla war in Guatemala so as to be able to open up a free trade zone between Mexico and
Central America. At this point, Mexico has decided that the best way it can contribute to this goal is
by backing the Serrano administration. A Guatemalan administration has not received such strong
support from Mexico for decades. Mexico's shift in policy has had a strong impact. On the one
hand, the Serrano government has felt comfortable with nearly abandoning the bargaining table.
On the other, the guerrillas have been severely weakened by the loss of support from a country
that had provided logistical and political backing. In addition, the Guatemalan opposition has been
unable to gain support from other Latin American countries for a condemnation of human rights
violations. During the UN Human Rights Commission annual meeting in Geneva last February, all
the developed countries, including Western Europe, the United States, and Canada, pressed for a
strong condemnation of Guatemala. But the Latin Americans refused to back the resolution that
would have transferred Guatemala from category 21 to category 12. Category 21 means a human
rights violator is under "observation" by the UN Commission, and category 12, characterizes the
violator as one of the world's worst, and stipulates the appointment of a special UN human rights
monitor. The Latin American position can be attributed, in part, to solidarity from other Latin
American nations who are themselves criticized as human rights violators. To summarize, if the
pressure from the international community for negotiations is diminishing, and if at the same time
the guerrillas have yet to demonstrate internally that they are a real military contender, then what
reason does the Guatemalan government have to pursue peace talks?

©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 4 of 5

LADB Article Id: 061227
ISSN: 1089-1560

-- End --

©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 5 of 5

